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a b s t r a c t
We study the effects of the US Federal Reserve’s large-scale asset purchase programs during 2008–
2014 on bank liquidity creation. Banks create liquidity when they transform the liquid reserves resulted
from quantitative easing (QE) into illiquid assets. As the composition of banks’ loan portfolio affects the
amount of liquidity it creates, the impact of quantitative easing on liquidity creation is not a priori clear.
Using a difference-in-difference identiﬁcation strategy, we ﬁnd that banks more affected by the policy increased lending relative to those less affected, mainly during the ﬁrst and third round of QE. However, we
only ﬁnd a strong effect of the policy on liquidity creation during the third round of QE. This points to a
weaker impact on the real economy during the ﬁrst two rounds, when more exposed banks transformed
the reserves created through QE into less illiquid assets, such as real estate mortgages.
© 2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)

1. Introduction
Following the 2008-09 Global Financial Crisis, a growing number of central banks have included large-scale asset purchase programs (LSAPs) in their toolkit of unconventional monetary policies. The US Federal Reserve, in particular, implemented several
rounds of quantitative easing (QE) through which they purchased
both agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and Treasury securities.1 The scale and unprecedented use of these unconventional
policies has led to a large interest in understanding their effect on
the banking sector and the real economy. Initial studies document
an important effect of LSAPs on medium to long-term yields and
asset prices through a signaling or portfolio-rebalancing channel

(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Gagnon et al., 2011;
D’Amico et al., 2012).2
Quantitative easing can also lead to an increase in credit supply through a classical bank lending channel, as the new reserves
and/or customer deposits created by QE represent a relatively
cheap source of funding for banks, which can result in a shift in
loan supply (Kashyap and Stein, 20 0 0; Butt et al., 2014; Kandrac
and Schlusche, 2017).3 Yet, evidence on the impact of QE on bank
lending is more confounded. Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and
Luck and Zimmermann (2020) ﬁnd that banks increased overall
lending after the ﬁrst and third rounds of quantitative easing, with
the ﬁrst corresponding mostly to an increase in mortgage origination, and the third round to an increase in both real estate, as
well as commercial and industrial loans. Chakraborty et al. (2020),
on the other hand, ﬁnd that the increase in mortgage lending
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1
The Federal Reserve implemented three rounds of QE following the Global
Financial Crisis: the ﬁrst (QE1) started in November 2008, the second (QE2) in
November 2010 and third (QE3) in September 2012.

2
Under these channels, the central bank affects the relative supply of different
assets, thereby lowering their yields and increasing the prices of current asset holdings of banks. The strength of the effect generally depends on the type of assets
the central bank is purchasing. For instance, Di Maggio et al. (2020) ﬁnd that, while
loan interest rates decreased on average as a result of the policy, the decrease was
substantially larger for assets that were conforming with the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs)-guaranteed mortgages that the Fed was purchasing.
3
Regardless of whether a bank or a bank customer is the ultimate seller of the
securities purchased by the Federal Reserve through QE, the reserves created by the
policy will be held by banks. If the seller is a bank, securities are simply swapped
for reserves on the bank’s balance sheet. If the seller is a non-bank entity, bank
deposits will also increase by the amount of securities sold to the Fed.
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crowded-out the origination of commercial loans, the latter actually decreasing as a result of the Fed’s asset purchase programs.
In this paper, we study the implications of this heterogeneous
impact of QE on lending for bank liquidity creation, one of the
most important raison d’être of ﬁnancial intermediaries.4 Banks
create liquidity in the economy by ﬁnancing relatively illiquid assets such as business loans with relatively liquid liabilities such
as deposits (Bryant, 1980; Berger and Bouwman, 2009). This key
role of ﬁnancial intermediaries has been shown theoretically to improve the allocation of capital in the economy (Donaldson et al.,
2018) and is robustly linked empirically to real output growth
(Berger and Sedunov, 2017). As such, the ability of banks to provide liquidity was the main focus of policymakers at the peak of
the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, when large and explicit government support was granted to banks to support liquidity creation
(Acharya and Mora, 2015; Bai et al., 2018). However, the role of
later unconventional policies such as LSAPs is less clear.
Through QE, the central bank purchases assets and credits the
reserves account of banks, which can then use this liquidity injection to invest in relatively more illiquid assets, such as loans to
businesses and individuals, thereby creating new liquidity in the
economy. Crucial to our analysis are the types of loans given by
banks, as their liquidity differs. For instance, classical measures of
liquidity creation like Berger and Bouwman (2009) assume that
loans that can be securitized and sold off the balance sheet, such
as real estate mortgages, are less illiquid and, as such, lead to less
liquidity creation in the economy. Hence, the amount of liquidity
created in the banking sector depends on the composition of the
asset side of banks’ balance sheets as a result of this policy intervention.
We thus investigate the impact of the Fed’s quantitative easing programs on bank liquidity creation using a sample of US
bank-holding companies during 2006–2014. In doing so, we study
the distributional effects of QE within the balance sheet of ﬁnancial intermediaries using a difference-in-differences identiﬁcation strategy that follows Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and
Luck and Zimmermann (2020). This strategy exploits the crosssectional variation in banks’ exposure to the Fed’s large-scale asset
purchase programs. The underlying argument is that banks with a
higher share of mortgage-backed securities in total assets beneﬁted
more from the program.5 We employ several deﬁnitions based on
the share of MBS-to-total assets prior to QE to classify banks into
treated and control groups and investigate the differential effect of
the policy across banks.
We ﬁrst study the impact of QE and bank lending. Similar to
previous work, we ﬁnd that banks with a higher MBS-to-total assets ratio had a disproportionally larger increase in lending. This
differential effect is stronger during the ﬁrst and third round of

QE, when treated banks increased both real estate and commercial
loans. However, while the increase in lending was present across
the two rounds of QE, we only ﬁnd a robust effect on liquidity
creation during the third round, when the Fed purchased a large
amount of MBS securities. During this last round, banks with a
higher MBS-to-total assets ratio created around 4% more liquidity
relative to their size as compared to the control group. This implies that, during the ﬁrst two rounds, treated banks transformed
the reserves created by QE into less illiquid assets such as real estate mortgages, pointing to a weaker impact of the policy on the
real economy.
Our main measure of liquidity creation follows Berger and
Bouwman (2009), however our results are robust to different definitions of liquidity creation proposed by Bai et al. (2018) or
Deep and Schaefer (2004). Our ﬁndings also survive a battery of
other robustness tests including various deﬁnitions of the treated
and control groups, as well as controlling for bank-level characteristics. Furthermore, we include alongside bank ﬁxed effects, yearquarter ﬁxed effects to mitigate potential demand-side factors that
can inﬂuence the composition of banks’ loan portfolio and the
amount of liquidity created on their balance sheets. The results are
also robust to the inclusion of state-time ﬁxed effects that allow
us to control for aggregate demand conditions in a given state and
quarter.
Our work provides a novel and robust channel through which
unconventional monetary policy can affect the functioning of the
banking sector and its impact on the real economy. This contributes to a growing empirical literature that studies the channels
through which unconventional policies such as QE are transmitted
through the economy. These channels include the signaling channel (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2014), portfolio-rebalancing channel (Gagnon et al., 2011;
D’Amico and King, 2013; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2016), reserves accumulation (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2017; Butt et al.,
2014; Ryan and Whelan, 2019) or bank lending (Rodnyansky and
Darmouni, 2017; Chakraborty et al., 2020).
Closest to our approach is the literature on the impact
of QE on bank lending. For instance, Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) also exploit the cross-sectional variation of banks’
exposure to mortgage-backed securities to show that banks
with larger MBS holdings expanded both real estate and corporate lending more than their counterparts. Similarly, Luck and
Zimmermann (2020) ﬁnd that the ﬁrst round of QE led
to mostly an increase in mortgage origination, while in the
third round both real estate and commercial lending increased.
Chakraborty et al. (2020) also ﬁnd that high-MBS banks disproportionally increased mortgage origination. However, they also
show that these banks reduced commercial lending, suggesting a crowding out effect of QE. The main difference between Chakraborty et al. (2020) and Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) rests in the way QE is deﬁned. We use both deﬁnitions in this paper to study the role of QE in liquidity creation.
Furthermore, Di Maggio et al. (2020) shows that the type of assets purchased through QE has an impact on the type of loans
originated. For example, QE1, which involved signiﬁcant purchases
of GSE-guaranteed mortgages, increased GSE-guaranteed mortgage
originations signiﬁcantly more than the origination of non-GSE
mortgages. Kandrac and Schlusche (2017) show that reserves created by the Fed as a result of the ﬁrst two QE programs led to
higher total loan growth and an increase in the share of riskier
loans within banks’ portfolios. Butt et al. (2014), on the other hand,
ﬁnd little effect of QE on lending in the UK, since they show that
the increase in deposits created by the policy was short-lived. Similar evidence is provided in Ryan and Whelan (2019), who show
that euro area banks mainly used the reserves created by the ECB’s

4
Modern theory of ﬁnancial intermediation argues that banks exist to perform
two central roles in the economy: create liquidity and transform risk (Diamond,
1984; Ramakrishnan and Thakor, 1984; Boyd and Prescott, 1986). While risk transformation and liquidity creation sometimes coincide - for example when riskless
liquid liabilities are transformed into risky illiquid assets-, bank liquidity creation is
often seen as a distinct function of banks (Gorton and Pennacchi, 1990; Gorton and
Winton, 2003).
5
There are several reasons why banks that held more mortgage-backed securities
beneﬁted more from the large scale asset programs. First, during the three waves
of QE, the Fed focused on easing the deterioration in the MBS market by lowering
yields and increasing the prices of banks’ current asset holdings, thereby improving
the balance sheets of banks that held higher shares of mortgage-backed securities.
Second, banks with more MBS sold to the Fed saw a higher increase in reserves,
which should have shifted their loan supply (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2017). Third,
banks with higher MBS holdings might have a different business model and will
particularly increase their real estate lending as their liquidity position improves. Finally, since the QE programs were largely unanticipated, especially the third round,
banks that held more MBS had a prompt recovery in stocks and an improved capital
position (see Washington Post, 2012).
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QE programs to purchase debt securities and less so to increase
lending.
Our work complements these ﬁndings by focusing on a distinct
channel through which QE might affect the real economy, i.e. liquidity creation. There are several reasons to focus on the impact
of QE on liquidity creation. First, liquidity creation is a key role of
ﬁnancial intermediaries that has been shown to be a superior measure of bank output and an important channel that can explain the
role of ﬁnancial development in economic growth (Berger and Sedunov, 2017). Second, Donaldson et al. (2018) show theoretically
how liquidity creation emerged historically as a key function of
banks, through which bank lending increases aggregate investment
in the economy by enabling positive net present value projects
to be undertaken that would be unfeasible without bank liquidity creation. Moreover, the more illiquid the assets created by the
bank, the more liquidity is created in the economy. This argument
is in the spirit of empirical measures of liquidity creation such as
Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Bai et al. (2018). These measures
compute liquidity creation by assigning different weights to bank
assets and liabilities depending on how easily they can be sold or
redeemed, implying that banks contribute more to liquidity creation when they create more illiquid assets, such as commercial
loans. Given the heterogeneous impact of QE on different types of
loans suggested by previous research, the impact of the policy on
liquidity creation is not obvious. Finally, measures of liquidity creation also include the liquidity created off-balance sheet through
loan commitments or similar claims to liquid funds. As such, looking only at assets on the balance sheet might mask important effects of the policy, particularly if one type of lending crowds out
another (as in Chakraborty et al., 2020).
Finally, our work is also related to a recent literature that looks
at how banks’ liquidity positions affect lending, in particular during periods of bank distress. For instance, Cornett et al. (2011) ﬁnd
that banks with more illiquid asset portfolios, i.e., those banks
that held more loans and securitized assets, increased their holdings of liquid assets and decreased lending following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008. Similarly, Dagher and Kazimov (2015) ﬁnd that banks more exposed to wholesale funding
shocks cut credit more for illiquid loans. Our work takes a new approach to understand how banks create liquidity by looking at the
effect of policy interventions on this essential feature of ﬁnancial
intermediation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 describes our conceptual framework and the mechanism
we investigate. Section 3 discusses the data and identiﬁcation
strategy. Section 4 presents our results, while Section 5 concludes.

Fig. 1. Evolution of Total Reserves during QE. The ﬁgure shows the evolution of
reserves for all US Bank Holding Companies in our dataset ranging from 2006Q1 to
2014Q4. The shaded areas highlight the three rounds of QE.

Fed. Thus, regardless who the ultimate seller of securities is, large
scale asset programs result in an increase in bank reserves. This
is evident in Fig. 1 for our sample of banks. A notably sharper increase can be observed after QE3, which entailed the largest volume of purchased assets and, as a result, reserves creation.
This signiﬁcant injection of reserves should affect banks’ optimal portfolio allocation by changing their liquidity proﬁle and duration of assets (Joyce and Spaltro, 2014; Kandrac and Schlusche,
2017). This might, in turn, induce banks to engage in additional
lending (see Bianchi and Bigio, 2014, for a general equilibrium
model). However, from the point of view of the amount of overall liquidity created in the banking sector, the composition of this
increase in lending is important, as the example below will show.
We use a simple example to illustrate the confounding effects
of QE on the liquidity created by banks. Liquidity creation captures
the ability of banks to honour the obligations associated with liquid deposits, while having assets that are mainly illiquid, which
reﬂects the classic liquidity transformation mechanism associated
with modern fractional reserve banking. If, for instance, banks had
to hold liquid assets to fully back every dollar of liquid deposits,
then they would not really be involved in liquidity creation. Effectively, they would be acquiring liquid assets and holding them on
behalf of their depositors, in a similar manner to a money market
mutual fund.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose a measure that captures
the extent of liquidity creation occurring via banks.7 Since liquidity
creation implies that liquid deposits are used to ﬁnance illiquid assets such as loans, the measure assigns positive weights to all illiquid assets and liquid liabilities on and off the balance sheet. Banks
can also “destroy” liquidity when illiquid liabilities and equity are
transformed into liquid assets. As such, illiquid liabilities and liquid
assets are assigned a negative weight. Moreover, since the degree
of “liquidity” of a balance sheet item can differ, Berger and Bouwman (2009) classify assets and liabilities into three categories: liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid. For assets, this depends on how easy
and fast a bank can sell them to meet liquidity demands, while
for liabilities, on how easy customers can withdraw their funds
from the bank. Weights are then assigned to reﬂect the idea that
liquidity creation occurs when the bank ﬁnances relatively illiq-

2. Transmission mechanism
The Federal Reserve implemented three rounds of QE during
2008–2012 through which it purchased mortgage-backed and/or
treasury securities by crediting the reserves accounts of banks who
sold (or whose customers sold) securities to the Fed.6 If the ﬁnal
seller is a bank, securities are simply swapped for reserves on the
bank’s balance sheet. If the seller is a non-bank entity, bank deposits will also increase by the amount of securities sold to the
6
In the ﬁrst round (QE1), from 2008Q4 (November) to 2010Q2 (June), the
Fed purchased $100 billion GSE debt (bonds issued by government-sponsored
enterprise- Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Federal Loans & Mortgage Corps, Freddie Mac)
and $1,250 billion Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) ($500 billion non-agency MBS
and $750 billion agency). The second round (QE2) was implemented from 2010Q4
(November) to 2011Q2 (June), where the Fed purchased $600 billion Treasury bills.
The third round (QE3) ran from 2012Q3 (September) to 2014Q3 (October) and included purchases of $40 billion MBS and $45 billion Treasury securities per month.
At the end of the three rounds, the balance of the Fed contained $1.75 trillion MBS
and $1.68 trillion Treasury bills.

7
Deep and Schaefer (2004) and Bai et al. (2018) propose different measures of
liquidity creation, which we employ in the empirical strategy. For this example, we
focus on the Berger and Bouwman (2009) index, which is simpler to illustrate numerically.
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Table 1
The impact of QE on liquidity creation: a simple example.
Control bank
Assets

Treated bank (Case 1)
Liabilities

Deposits +10

1
2

Liabilities

× 10 = 10

Reserves +0
Deposits +10
MBS -100
C&I Loans +10
RE Loans +100
LC = 12 × 10 + 12 × 10 − 0 × 100 = 10

Treated bank (Case 2)

Treated bank (Case 3)

C&I Loans +10

LC =

Assets

× 10 +

1
2

Assets

Liabilities

Reserves +20
Deposits +10
MBS -100
C&I Loans +10
RE lending +80
LC = 12 × 10 + 12 × 10 − 12 × 20 + 0 × 80 = 0

Assets

Liabilities

Reserves +0
Deposits +10
MBS -100
C&I Loans +60
RE lending +50
LC = 12 × 60 + 12 × 10 + 0 × 50 = 35

Treated bank (Case 4)
Assets

Liabilities

Reserves +0
Deposits +10
MBS -100
C&I Loans +0
RE lending +110
LC = 12 × 0 + 12 × 10 + 0 × 110 = 5

uid assets with relatively liquid liabilities. Therefore, a weight of
1/2 is applied to illiquid assets and liquid liabilities. Conversely,
a weight of -1/2 is applied to liquid assets and illiquid liabilities
and a weight of 0 is assigned to semi-liquid assets and liabilities.
Appendix B discusses in detail the construction of this liquidity index.
The example in Table 1 shows how liquidity creation following the deﬁnition above can be affected by QE. In this example a
“Treated bank” is one which sells MBS to the Fed for a value of,
say, 100, which results in a corresponding increase in Reserves by
100. The “Control bank” is not affected by the asset purchase program, but we assume all banks have an increase in deposits of 10.
Suppose the “Control bank” invests the 10 additional deposits in
commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. This leads to a liquidity creation of 10 by transforming the most liquid liabilities (deposits),
which have a weight of 1/2 in the Berger and Bouwman (2009) index, into the most illiquid assets (loans to enterprises), which are
also assigned a weight of 1/2. We then analyze three different scenarios, where the Treated banks also invest the additional deposits
of 10 in C&I loans, but differ in how they invest the new reserves
created by QE.
In Case 1, the Treated bank invests all the new reserves created by the policy in real estate (RE) loans. Since RE lending can
be securitized and sold, it is considered a semi-liquid asset and is
assigned a weight of 0 in the Berger and Bouwman (2009) index.
The total amount of liquidity creation in this case is the same as
the control bank. In Case 2, the bank keeps 20% of the reserves and
uses the rest to fund RE loans. For this particular example, the liquidity created is zero and, as such, below that of the control bank.
In Case 3 we assume that the treated bank uses all reserves to invest in RE lending and C&I lending in equal shares. In this case, the
level of liquidity created is greater than that of the control bank.
Finally, Case 4 assumes that the QE program crowds out C&I lending by making real estate loans more appealing. Here again, liquidity creation is lower as compared to the control bank.
As this simple example shows, whether banks exposed to QE
create more liquidity in the banking sector depends crucially on
the distribution of assets on their balance sheet after the policy. If
QE crowded out C&I lending, as shown in Chakraborty et al. (2020),

we should expect that treated banks created less liquidity as compared to the control ones. If banks increase both real estate and
industrial lending, the amount of liquidity created depends on the
relative size of each asset class. As such, the effect of QE on liquidity creation is not a priori clear.8
3. Data and identiﬁcation strategy
We obtain bank-level data from the Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) FR Y-9C quarterly reports, that are ﬁlled by BHC with at least $500 million in total
assets.9 Our sample consists of quarterly data from 2006:Q1 to
2014:Q4 and comprises of 7124 unique BHCs over this time frame.
The number of BHCs varies across quarters due to different reporting requirements, with an average of 1200 BHCs reporting data in
all quarters and 5500 BHCs reporting only bi-annually (in Q2 and
Q4).10 Table 2 presents some descriptive statistics for key variables
included in the dataset. We describe the construction and deﬁnitions of all variables in Appendix A.
Our main dependent variable is a measure of liquidity creation
at the bank level. Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose four measures of liquidity creation: (i) cat fat, which classiﬁes assets and
liabilities based on their type (liquid, illiquid and semi-liquid) and
8
In the example above, we have assumed that the bank is the ultimate seller
of securities to the Fed. If the ultimate seller is a bank customer, then deposits are
also likely to rise. This would imply a similar ambiguous effect on liquidity creation.
Such potential changes to bank deposits further motivates our empirical strategy
that focuses on liquidity creation as opposed to only lending behaviour, as measures
of liquidity creation will also account for the evolution of the liability side banks’
balance sheets.
9
The FR Y-9C reports provide not only balance sheet data, but also capital positions, risk-weighted assets, securitization activities and off-balance sheet exposures,
among others.The data is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago at
https://www.chicagofed.org/applications/bhc/bhc-home.
10
Consolidated Report of Condition and Income (FR Y-9C) contains separate reporting for the parent company of large BHCs (FR Y-9LP) and parent company of
small BHCs (FR Y-9SP). The number of observations varies from quarter to quarter
because the Y-9SP is collected on a semiannual basis (in June and December). Since
holding companies that ﬁle this report are included in those quarters, there is a
signiﬁcant increase in the number of observations for June and December. The ﬁrst
and third quarter only include banks that ﬁle the Y-9C and Y-9LP.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics.
Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

p25

p50

p75

Observations

Log (Assets)
Equity/assets
MBS/assets
MBS/securities
Securities/assets
Deposits/assets
Reserves/assets
Real estate lending/assets
C&I loans/assets
Total lending/assets
Return on Assets (ROA)
Borrowings/ assets

14.2
0.1
0.1
0.45
0.2
0.78
0.06
0.5
0.097
0.66
0.03
0.122

1.33
0.05
0.09
0.29
0.12
0.12
0.057
0.16
0.068
0.14
0.69
0.11

13.35
0.08
0.027
0.21
0.11
0.75
0.023
0.41
0.051
0.6
0.01
0.06

13.76
0.09
0.077
0.47
0.18
0.81
0.037
0.52
0.083
0.68
0.02
0.1

14.52
0.11
0.14
0.68
0.26
0.85
0.072
0.61
0.13
0.76
0.03
0.15

36,989
36,989
29,810
29,761
36,989
34,468
36,989
36,989
36,989
36,989
36,989
34,468

Summary statistics recorded from 2006Q1 to 2014Q4 for all U.S. BHCs. All variables are at quarterly frequency. Variable deﬁnitions are provided in Appendix A.

holdings across banks. This methodology relies on the assumption that banks that held more MBS on their balance sheet were
more likely to be affected by the Fed’s asset purchases. Several arguments support this claim. First, during the three waves of QE,
the Fed focused on easing the deterioration in the MBS market
by lowering yields and increasing the prices of banks’ current asset holdings, thereby improving the balance sheets of banks that
held higher shares of mortgage-backed securities. This increase in
prices of banks’ assets could have improved their capital positions,
which have been shown theoretically and empirically to be correlated with higher liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009;
Donaldson et al., 2018). Second, banks with more MBS sold to the
Fed saw a higher increase in reserves, which should have shifted
their loan supply (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2017).
We measure a bank’s exposure to QE by the ratio of MBS-tototal assets. Following Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), we deﬁne
as the treatment group banks in the highest 25% of the MBS-tototal assets distribution, while those in the lowest 25% are included
in the control group. To minimize endogeneity, banks are classiﬁed according to their MBS-to-total assets ratio in 2007:Q4, which
is more than half a year before QE1. We also consider several alternative deﬁnitions for the assignment to treatment and control
groups. First, we classify banks in the top decile of the distribution of MBS-to-total assets into the treatment group, and those in
the bottom decile in the control. Second, we employ the ratio of
MBS-to-total assets in 2007:Q4, which allows for an analysis of the
entire sample of banks.
As shown in Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017), the classiﬁcation of banks into treatment and control groups is rather stable
over time, as the level of MBS-to-total assets is fairly sticky. This
alleviates the concern that banks might respond strategically to the
LSAPs by increasing their holdings of mortgage-based securities.
Nonetheless, it might be that banks in the treatment and control
groups are systematically different along a number of characteristics. To check this, we perform simple cross-sectional correlations
between the treatment assignment variable and a number of bank
characteristics. The results are presented in Table 3, where T reati
is the treatment deﬁnition based on quartiles (column 1), T reatiD

Fig. 2. Evolution of liquidity creation. The ﬁgure shows the average ratio of liquidity
creation to total assets in our sample of banks. Shaded areas highlight the three
episodes of QE.

includes off-balance sheet items; (ii) cat non-fat follows the same
classiﬁcation, but excludes any off-balance sheet items; (iii) mat fat
deﬁnes assets and liabilities based on maturity/duration and includes off-balance sheet components and ﬁnally, (iv) mat non-fat
includes a classiﬁcation by maturity, but excludes off-balance sheet
items.11 As the authors argue, the most comprehensive measure is
the cat fat one, which will also be our main measure of liquidity
creation.12 A description of the weights and construction of the index is presented in Appendix B.
Fig. 2 shows the ratio of liquidity creation to total assets over
the sample period. Liquidity creation drops considerably in 2008Q4
and remains at low levels until 2012, when a sharp increase is
noticed. This improvement in liquidity creation coincides with the
Fed’s third round of QE.
3.1. Identiﬁcation strategy





MBS
the one based on deciles (column 2), and Assets
is the ratio of
i
MBS-to-total assets in 2007:Q4 (column 3).
These simple correlations suggest that banks that hold more
mortgage backed securities tend to be different than control banks
along several characteristics, which include size (log of assets),
proﬁtability (Net income to total assets), leverage (Equity to assets), and the ratio of securities to assets. As such, treated banks
are typically larger, more leveraged, less proﬁtable and hold more
securities as a share of total assets. Importantly, however, treated

Our identiﬁcation strategy follows Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) and exploits the cross-sectional variation in MBS
11
Off-balance sheet activities, such as loan commitments and guarantees, allow
customers to draw-down funds, and are considered important contributors to liquidity creation (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997; Kashyap et al., 2002).
12
The Berger and Bouwman (2009) index of liquidity creation has been widely
used to examine, among others, the role of bank capital (Horváth et al., 2014; Kim
and Sohn, 2017), bank regulation and governance (Berger et al., 2016; Díaz and
Huang, 2017; Huang et al., 2018), competition (Jiang et al., 2019) or monetary policy
(Berger and Bouwman, 2017) on liquidity creation.
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Table 3
Correlations between Treatment Group and Bank Characteristics .

coeff

SE
∗∗∗

Log(Assets)
Tier 1 Capital Ratio
Securities/Assets
Equity/Assets
Lending/Assets
Net income/Total Assets

0.082
–0.011
2.644∗ ∗ ∗
0.678
0.334
–54.09∗ ∗ ∗

Observations
R-squared

472
0.440



T reatiD
(2)

T reati
(1)
coeff

[0.017]
[0.008]
[0.295]
[0.806]
[0.272]
[9.564]

0.050
–0.004
2.219∗ ∗ ∗
–0.195
0.103
–49.98∗ ∗ ∗
189
0.519

(3)

SE
∗



MBS
Assets i

[0.029]
[0.009]
[0.438]
[1.185]
[0.388]
[15.42]

coeff

SE
∗∗∗

0.010
0.001
0.464∗ ∗ ∗
–0.232∗ ∗
0.070∗ ∗
–1.561

[0.002]
[0.000]
[0.035]
[0.105]
[0.029]
[1.194]

938
0.414

The table shows correlations between the treatment condition and bank characteristics in 2007Q1.
T reati is a dummy that takes the value one for banks in the 75th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the 25th percentile. T reatiD is a dummy that takes the value one for
th
th
banks
in the 90 percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the 10 percentile.
MBS
is the ratio of MBS to Total assets in 2007:Q4. Robust standard errors in brackets. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗
Assets i
represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Fig. 3. Evolution of total reserves for treated and control banks. The ﬁgure shows
the evolution of reserves for treated and control banks. Treated banks are banks in
the top 75th percentile of MBS-to-total assets ratio in 2007Q4, while control are in
the bottom 25th percentile. Shaded areas highlight the three episodes of QE.

Fig. 4. MBS-to-total assets for treated and control banks. The ﬁgure maps the evolution of the ratio of MBS-to-assets for treated and control banks. Treated banks
are banks in the top 75th percentile of MBS-to-total assets ratio in 2007Q4, while
control are in the bottom 25th percentile. Shaded areas highlight the three episodes
of QE.

banks do not have a higher share of lending to total assets prior to
the implementation of QE.
The underlying argument behind our identiﬁcation strategy is
that banks with a higher share of mortgage-backed securities
in total assets prior to QE (treated banks) beneﬁted more from
the program. Fig. 3 shows the reserve accumulation by treated
and control banks throughout the sample period. Clearly, we
observe that banks in the treatment group witnessed a higher
surge in reserves relative to control banks, potentially as a result
of QE.
This differential evolution of reserves can be explained in two
ways. First, treated banks who held more MBS before QE also sold
more MBS to the Fed afterwards. Fig. 4, which shows the evolution
of the MBS-to-total assets of treated and control banks separately,
supports this argument: MBS holdings of treated banks (solid line)
start to decline immediately after the implementation of QE, while
control banks (dashed line) see an increase. Second, as most of the
sales of MBS to the Fed during QE actually came from non-bank
entities, the pattern in Fig. 3 could also be the result of treated
banks having more clients that sold MBS to the Fed. Since only
banks hold accounts with the Fed, sales of securities to the central bank by any institution transits through the balance sheet of
a bank: the Fed credits banks’ reserve accounts, which leads to

a build up of bank reserves and an increase in bank customers’
deposits on the liabilities side of the bank’s balance sheet. Fig. 5
shows that customer deposits did increase in the sample of treated
banks, especially after QE2. That being said, it is clear that no single mechanism explains why banks with higher MBS were more
affected by the Fed MBS purchases, rather this can be explained
through a variety of distinct direct and indirect purchase mechanisms.
Our identiﬁcation strategy exploits the cross-sectional variation
in banks’ exposure to the Fed’s large-scale asset purchases via
difference-in-differences regressions, as follows:

Yi, j,t = αi + β j,t + θ  T reati × QEτ + γ  QEτ + ηT reati + δ  Xi,t +

i,t ,

(1)
where Yi, j,t is a measure of liquidity creation by bank i in state j
at time t. Q E τ = [Q E1, Q E2, Q E3] is a vector of time dummies corresponding to the introduction of each QE episode. QE1 takes the
value 1 during the period 2008:Q4 (November) - 2010:Q2 (June),
QE2 from 2010:Q4 (November) - 2011:Q2 (June) and QE3 from
2012:Q3 (September) to 2014:Q3 (October), respectively. T reati is
an indicator variable and takes the value of 1 if a bank belongs
to the treatment group and 0 if the bank belongs to the control
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ing channel as the new reserves and/or deposits resulting from
the policy lead to a shift in the loan supply. There are also several reasons to believe that ﬁnancial institutions might respond
to the policy by increasing some types of loans and not others.
In particular, previous work points to a strong impact of QE on
real estate lending. This could be due to the fact that banks with
higher MBS shares (our treatment group) are more active in the
mortgage market and more exposed to the housing market in general (Luck and Zimmermann, 2020). As such higher MBS shares
could reﬂect a different business model, which implies that, as the
prospects of the housing market improved due to QE, these banks
beneﬁted more and were more likely to engage in mortgage origination or reﬁnancing. For example, Di Maggio et al. (2020) show
that the type of assets purchased by the Fed matters for the type
of loans originated by banks. Particularly, they ﬁnd that banks
mainly issued GSE-guaranteed mortgages, which were eligible for
sale to the Federal Reserve during QE1, and less so non-eligible
mortgages.
To study the heterogeneous impact of QE on different types of
loans, we follow closely the empirical strategy in Rodnyansky and
Darmouni (2017) who use the Call Reports (FFIEC 031) data for a
larger sample of BHCs over the period 2008–2014. We thus estimate the baseline difference-in-difference regressions in Eq. (1),
where we replace Yi,t with the logarithm of total lending, real estate lending and commercial and industrial lending, respectively.
We employ two treatment deﬁnitions: (i) T reati that takes the
value of 1 if the bank is in the top 75th percentile of MBS-toth
total assets in 2007Q4
 MBSand
 0 if the bank is in the bottom 25
percentile, and (ii) Assets that is the ratio of MBS-to-total assets
i
in 2007Q4.
Furthermore, as the classiﬁcation of banks by MBS holdings
is correlated with bank size (see Table 3), we employ matching
techniques to further reduce biases that stem from the endogeneous determination of MBS holdings (see also Rodnyansky and
Darmouni, 2017). Speciﬁcally, we match our treated and control
groups by size using propensity scores based on a logit model that
relates the probability of being assigned to the treated group to
the log of total assets in 2007Q4. We then employ this propensity score to re-weight treatment and control groups such that
the distribution of bank size looks the same in both groups. This
is done using the conditional probability of being in the treated
ˆ ) (see
ˆ , to compute a weight as the odds ratio λ
ˆ / (1 − λ
group, λ
Nichols, 2007).
The results are presented in Table 4. Columns (1)-(2) pertain
to total lending, columns (3)-(4) to RE lending and (5)-(6) to C&I
loans, respectively. Across both deﬁnitions of treated and control
banks, we ﬁnd that treated banks expanded lending more than
control banks. For total and RE lending these differential effects are
robust across all speciﬁcations for the ﬁrst and third round of QE,
while the effect on corporate lending is robustly estimated only
during QE3. These results are in line with previous research that
shows a stronger impact of QE1 and QE3 on overall lending, given
that the Federal Reserve purchased MBS only during these rounds
of QE, and not in the second (Rodnyansky and Darmouni, 2017;
Luck and Zimmermann, 2020; Kurtzman et al., 2018).14 Our results
also point to an overall stronger impact of QE on mortgage lending
as compared to commercial loans, which can have implications for
liquidity creation. We turn to this next.

Fig. 5. Total deposits-to-total assets for treated and control banks. The ﬁgure shows
the distribution of deposits-to-assets for treated and control banks. Treated banks
are banks in the top 75th percentile of MBS-to-total assets ratio, while control are
in the bottom 25th percentile. Shaded areas highlight the three episodes of QE.

group. T reati × QE τ is an interaction term between a bank’s treatment status and time dummies corresponding to each QE episode.
The vector θ captures our coeﬃcients of interest, namely the differential impact of each round of QE on liquidity creation in the
treated as compared to the control group.
Vector Xi,t includes a series of bank-level controls that capture
differences in the scale and ﬁnancial position of banks that might
affect their lending activity (see Cornett et al., 2011; Berger and
Bouwman, 2013; Chakraborty et al., 2020). Particularly, we control for bank size, capital, proﬁtability and leverage, which have
been shown to affect loan supply and are also correlated with the
treatment condition (see, for example, Kashyap and Stein, 20 0 0).
We add bank ﬁxed effects to remove all time-invariant differences
across banks. Bank ﬁxed effects also capture the average difference
in liquidity creation between treated and control banks across the
sample period. Our baseline speciﬁcation also includes state-time
ﬁxed effects (β j,t ) to control for unobserved time-varying shocks
at the state-level that might affect both the demand and supply
of bank loans.13 This allows us to control closely to macroeconomic conditions and obtain identiﬁcation between banks in the
same state. The inclusion of this large set of ﬁxed effects also
absorbs the coeﬃcients of the three rounds of QE (γ  ) and the
treatment dummy (η) and reduces concerns of omitted variable
bias.
4. Results
This section examines the impact of Federal Reserve’s LSAP on
the lending behaviour of banks and liquidity creation. First, we
consider the effects of the three rounds of QE on lending, distinguishing between total lending, real estate (RE) loans and commercial and industrial (C&I) loans. Second, we present our main results
pertaining to liquidity creation. Lastly, we present a series of robustness tests of our main results.
4.1. The impact of QE on bank lending
Motivated by previous literature, we ﬁrst revisit the impact of
QE on bank lending in our sample of banks. As discussed in the Introduction, QE could impact lending through a classical bank lend-

14
Appendix Table 9, replicates more closely the empirical strategy in
Rodnyansky and Darmouni (2017) (see Table 6 in their paper), where we also
control for the interaction between dummies capturing the three rounds of QE
and the bank level controls to allow for possible heterogeneous responses to the
intervention by BHCs. This speciﬁcation also includes only year-quarter ﬁxed effects
as opposed to state-time ones. The results are qualitatively similar.

13
We also show the robustness of all results when including only year-quarter
ﬁxed affects.
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Table 4
The impact of QE on bank lending.
Total Lending
(1)
QE1 × T reati
QE2 × T reati
QE3 × T reati
QE1 ×
QE2 ×
QE3 ×







0.027∗ ∗ ∗
(0.009)
–0.059∗ ∗ ∗
(0.017)
0.032∗ ∗ ∗
(0.006)

MBS
Assets i

Real Estate Loans

C&I Loans

(3)

(5)

MBS
Assets i



MBS
Assets i

14,451
0.996
Yes
Yes
Yes

(4)

0.077∗ ∗ ∗
(0.020)
0.016
(0.018)
0.043∗ ∗ ∗
(0.009)

29,068
0.999
Yes
Yes
Yes

14,405
0.987
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)

0.012
(0.015)
0.007
(0.019)
0.038∗ ∗
(0.018)
0.207∗ ∗
(0.097)
0.126
(0.087)
0.356∗ ∗ ∗
(0.057)

0.055
(0.046)
–0.083
(0.091)
0.339∗ ∗ ∗
(0.044)



Observations
R-squared
Bank-level Controls
State-time Fixed Effects
Bank Fixed Effects

(2)

29,021
0.996
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.047
(0.097)
0.218∗
(0.111)
0.383∗ ∗ ∗
(0.113)
14,421
0.967
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,013
0.992
Yes
Yes
Yes

The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(2) is log of Total lending, in Columns (3)-(4) is the log of real
estate loans and in Column (5)-(6) is the log of commercial and industrial loans. T reati is a dummy
th
that takes the value one for banks
 MBS in
 the 75 percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for
is the ratio of MBS to Total assets in 2007Q4. QE1,QE2,QE3 are
banks in the 25th percentile. Assets
i
dummies for each QE wave. Bank-level controls include the log of total assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, the
net income to total assets and equity over assets. Constant terms included, but not reported. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

4.2. QE and bank liquidity creation
Our main empirical speciﬁcation estimates Eq. (1) using the
Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation index scaled by total assets as the dependent variable. The results are presented in
Table 5. We employ three treatment variables that classify banks
based on quartiles, deciles and the continuous measure of MBS-tototal assets.
As before, the main variables of interest are the interaction
terms between the QE time dummies and banks’ treatment status.
Columns (1)-(3) control for two-way ﬁxed effects at the state-time
level, which capture all time-varying aggregate demand factors at
the state level and allow us to obtain identiﬁcation from comparing banks in the same state in a given year-quarter. Columns (4)(6) show the robustness when controlling for year-quarter ﬁxed effects only.15
Overall, our results suggest that treated banks created a disproportionally larger amount of liquidity in the banking sector. However, this result is robustly estimated across all speciﬁcations only
for the third round of QE. With the ratio of liquidity creation to
total assets as the dependent variable and the interaction between
a QE dummy and a treatment dummy as the independent, the estimates in columns (1) and (3) suggest that, during QE3, treated
banks created close to 4% more liquidity relative to their size as
compared to the control group.
Coupled, the results in Tables 4 and 5 suggest that, while banks
with higher MBS/Total Assets were characterized by a disproportionally higher level of lending during both QE1 and QE3, this increase in lending resulted in a higher liquidity creation only during
QE3. This implies that, during the ﬁrst round of QE, treated banks
disproportionally created assets that are less illiquid, such as RE
loans, which points to a weaker impact of the policy on the real
economy.

Fig. 6. Liquidity creation for treated and control banks. Treated banks are those in
the 75th percentile of MBS-to-assets ratio in 2007Q4, while control those in the 25th
percentile. Shaded areas highlight the three episodes of QE.

4.3. Timing of the effects
A plausible identiﬁcation rests on the fact that the differential
effects documented thus far are not driven by preexisting trends
whereby treated banks create a signiﬁcantly higher level of liquidity to total assets even prior to the introduction of the different
rounds of QE. In this subsection, we provide further evidence supporting this identifying assumption.
First, Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the average liquidity creation to total assets by treated and control banks, where treated
banks are those in the 75th percentile of MBS-to-assets ratio in
2007Q4, while control are those in the 25th percentile, respectively. It shows that the measure of liquidity creation follows similar trends in the pre-QE period for both groups of banks, followed by a signiﬁcant decline at the start of the 2008 Global ﬁnancial crisis, as already documented in Fig. 2. Moreover, the ratio

15
Fig. 10 shows the coeﬃcient estimates of the same regressions as Table 5 where
matching based on propensity scores, as outlined above, is applied.
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Table 5
The impact of QE on bank liquidity creation.
Liquidity creation to total assets
(1)

QE2 × T reati
QE3 × T reati
QE1 ×
QE1 ×
QE1 ×





(2)

(3)

0.010∗ ∗
(0.005)
0.019∗ ∗
(0.007)
0.036∗ ∗ ∗
(0.005)

QE1 × T reati



MBS
Assets i

–0.043
(0.049)
0.054
(0.072)
0.235∗ ∗ ∗
(0.051)



MBS
Assets i



MBS
Assets i

(5)

(6)

0.075
(0.047)
0.065∗ ∗
(0.031)
0.063∗ ∗ ∗
(0.020)

QE1 × T reatiD
QE1 ×

(4)

0.057
(0.057)
0.153∗ ∗
(0.077)
0.299∗ ∗ ∗
(0.114)
0.018
(0.012)
0.029∗
(0.017)
0.037∗ ∗ ∗
(0.013)

T reatiD

QE1 × T reatiD
Observations
R-squared
Controls
State-time Fixed Effects
Year-quarter ﬁxed effects
Bank Fixed Effects

14,460
0.929
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

29,077
0.948
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

5488
0.954
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

0.109
(0.068)
0.089∗
(0.047)
0.076∗ ∗ ∗
(0.029)
14,620
0.128
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

29,181
0.039
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

5872
0.201
Yes
No
Yes
Yes

The dependent variable is ratio of liquidity creation to total assets. T reati is a dummy that takes the
value one for banks in the 75th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the
25th percentile. T reatiD is a dummy that takes the value one for banksin the 90th percentile of the MBSMBS
is the ratio of MBS-to-total
to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the bottom 10th percentile. Assets
i
assets in 2007Q4. Q E1, Q E2, Q E3 are dummies for each QE wave. Bank-level controls include the log of
total assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, the net income to total assets and equity over assets. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Table 6
Alternative identiﬁcation strategy.

the policy are rather immediate and do not follow a signiﬁcant
time lag.
To further investigate the timing of effects, we estimate the following model where, instead of dummy variables capturing the
full period of the three QE rounds, we interact the treatment variable with an indicator for each quarter. Precisely, the speciﬁcation
tested is:

Liquidity creation to total assets

MBS purchasest−1 × T reati
Treasury purchasest−1 × T reati

(1)

(2)

0.003∗ ∗ ∗
(0.001)
0.002∗ ∗
(0.001)

0.002∗ ∗ ∗
(0.000)
0.001∗ ∗ ∗
(0.000)

MBS purchasest−1 × T reatiD
Treasury purchasest−1 × T reatiD
Observations
R-squared
Controls
Bank Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
State time ﬁxed effects

11,680
0.057
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

11,492
0.940
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

(3)

(4)

0.003∗ ∗
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)

0.002∗ ∗
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

LC/T Ai, j,t = αi + β j,t +

4697
0.035
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

4337
0.962
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

where Dt is a vector of dummy variables for each t ∈
{20 07Q1, 20 07Q 2, . . . , 2014Q 4}\{2008Q 3}, with 2008Q3 taken as
the benchmark period. T reati a dummy that takes the value one
for banks in the 75th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio,
and zero for banks in the 25th percentile. Fig. 7 shows a plot of the
estimated coeﬃcients of θˆt in Eq. (2). Similar to the patterns observed thus far, it conﬁrms that treated banks had a signiﬁcantly
larger LC/TA in the quarter following the start of QE3, and not before.


t

γt Dt +



θt Dt × T reati + δ  Xi,t +

i,t ,

t

(2)

The dependent variable is the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation measure to total assets. MBSt−1 and T SYt−1 are the of log amount of mortgage-backed
securities Treasury securities purchased by the Fed during 2008–2014. T reati is a
dummy equal 1 for banks in the 75th percentile of MBS-to-assets ratio in 2007Q4,
and zero for those in the 25th percentile. T reatiD is a dummy equal 1 for banks
in the 90th percentile of MBS-to-assets ratio in 2007Q4, and zero for those in the
10th percentile. Bank-level controls include: logarithm of total assets, Tier 1 capital
ratio, deposits to assets ratio, equity to assets ratio and return on assets. Constant
term included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗
represent signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

4.4. Alternative identiﬁcation strategy
Chakraborty et al. (2020) investigate the impact of the Fed’s
LSAPs on bank lending and ﬁrm investment using an alternative
identiﬁcation strategy. They employ as independent variable the
actual amount of MBS and treasury securities purchased as opposed to time dummies corresponding to the introduction of each
QE episode. Fig. 8 shows these quantities in each quarter, and
clearly identiﬁes the start of the different QE rounds and how this
alternative measure captures the scale of each QE program. We follow their approach and interact the log amount of MBS and trea-

of LC/TA is actually higher in the control group for most of the period. However, a signiﬁcant change in trend is observed following
the start of the last round of QE in 2012Q3 when treated banks
see a larger increase in liquidity creation. This conﬁrms the effects documented in Table 5. It also suggests that the effects of
9
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Table 7
LMI index (Bai et al., 2018).
(1)
QE1 × T reati
QE2 × T reati
QE3 × T reati
QE1 ×
QE2 ×
QE3 ×







(2)

MBS
Assets i

0.031
(0.156)
0.318
(0.227)
0.407∗ ∗
(0.162)



MBS
Assets i



MBS
Assets i

QE1 × T reatiD

0.033
(0.106)
0.138
(0.156)
0.020
(0.113)

QE2 × T reatiD
QE3 × T reatiD

Fig. 7. Timing of effects. The ﬁgure shows coeﬃcient plots for the parameters θt
in Eq. 2 with 95% conﬁdence intervals. The vertical lines indicate the start of each
episode of quantitative easing.

Observations
R-squared
Controls
State-time Fixed Effects
Bank Fixed Effects

(3)

0.016
(0.042)
0.057
(0.062)
0.099∗ ∗
(0.045)

14,460
0.493
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,077
0.496
Yes
Yes
Yes

5488
0.519
Yes
Yes
Yes

The dependent variable is the Bai et al. (2018) LMI index.
T reati is a dummy that takes the value one for banks in the
75th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for
banks in the 25th percentile. T reatiD is a dummy that takes the
value one for banks in the 90th percentile of the MBS-to-total
assets ratio, and zero for banks in the bottom 10th percentile.
QE1, QE2, QE3 are dummies for each QE wave. Bank-level controls include: logarithm of total assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, deposits to assets ratio, equity to assets ratio and return on assets. Constant term included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ represent signiﬁcance at
the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

Fig. 8. Quarterly purchase of MBS and Treasury securities by the Fed. The ﬁgure
shows the quarterly amount of mortgage-backed securities (solid line) and Treasury
securities (dashed line) purchased by the Fed. The shaded areas indicate the three
rounds of quantitative easing.

sury purchases by the Fed in the last quarter of the previous year
(t − 1) with our treatment dummies.
Table 6 presents the results using this alternative independent variable interacted with the treatment variables based on
quartiles and deciles, respectively. The most robust evidence
points to an impact on liquidity creation following MBS purchases, and less so following purchases of T-bills, which mainly
occurred during QE2. This is in line with our previous results and Chakraborty et al. (2020), who also ﬁnd an impact on lending mainly following MBS purchases. Yet, unlike
Chakraborty et al. (2020), who ﬁnd that real estate mortgages
crowded out commercial loans, we ﬁnd a consistently positive impact on liquidity creation.

Fig. 9. Liquidity measures: cat fat and cat nonfat. The ﬁgure shows the evolution of
the average Berger and Bouwman (2009) cat fat (solid line) and cat nonfat (dashed
line) liquidity measures. Both indices are scaled by total assets.

a bank can sell an asset, whereas funding liquidity reﬂects how
quickly a bank can settle its obligations. Unlike the Berger and
Bouwman (2009) measure, the weights of the various components
in the LMI are time-varying and reﬂect the maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities. We follow Bai et al. (2018) and use
their data on repo market haircuts and spreads (price-based measures) to construct the index. The measure is constructed to cap-

4.5. Liquidity mismatch index
Bai et al. (2018) propose a more complex measure of liquidity creation, called the Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI). Similar to
the Berger and Bouwman (2009) measure, the LMI captures the
liquidity of both asset (market liquidity) as well as liability side
(funding liquidity). Market liquidity refers to the ease with which
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Table 8
Liquidity weights.
Category

Sub- category

Weights
in CATFAT

Weights in
LMI (mean)

Revised LMI
weights (mean)

Cash and balances due from depository
institutions (Liquid)
Federal funds sold (Liquid)
Securities purchased under agreement to resell
(Liquid)
Treasury securities (Liquid)
Agency securities (Liquid)
Securities issued by state and U.S. Pol.
Subdivisions (Liquid)
Non-agency MBS (Liquid)
Structural product (Liquid)
Corporate debt (Liquid)
Equity securities (Liquid)
Loans secured by real estate
Residential real estate loans (semi-liquid)
Commercial real estate loans (illiquid Assets)
Loans to ﬁnance agriculture (illiquid Assets)
Commercial and industrial loans (illiquid
Assets)
Other loans (illiquid Assets)
Lease ﬁnancing receivables (illiquid Assets)
Consumer loans (semi-liquid)
Loans to depository institutions (semi-liquid)
Loans to foreign government (semi-liquid)
Premises and ﬁxed assets (illiquid Assets)
Other real estate owned (illiquid Assets)
Investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries
(illiquid Assets)
Goodwill and other intangible assets (illiquid
Assets)
(illiquid Assets)

–1/2

1

–1

–1/2
–1/2

1
1

-1
-1

–1/2
–1/2
–1/2

0.9661693
0.9671359
0.8312621

–0.9661693
–0.9671359
–0.8312621

–1/2
–1/2
–1/2
–1/2

0.8672858
0.8672858
0.8290137
0.7790855
0.7198426

–0.8672858
-0.8672858
-0.8290137
-0.7790855
0.7198426

1

1

1/2
1/2
0
0
0
1/2
1/2
1/2

0.7198426
0.7198426

0.7198426
0.7198426

0
0
0

1
1
1

1/2

0

1

1/2

0

1

Overnight federal funds purchased (Liquid)
Securities sold under repo (Liquid)
Deposits (Liquid)
Demand/ transaction deposits (Liquid)
Savings deposits (Liquid)
Time deposits (semi-liquid)
Trading liabilities (Liquid)
Commercial paper (semi-liquid)
With maturity <=1 year (semi-liquid)
With maturity >1 year (semi-liquid)
Subordinated notes and debentures (Illiquid)
Other liabilities (Illiquid)
Equity (Illiquid)

1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
0
1/2
0
0
0
–1/2
–1/2
–1/2

-1
–1
–1.087827

1
1
1.087827

–.9712813
–1.006757
–1.087827
–1.674883
–4.004571
–2.285964
–0.1565224

0.9712813
1.006757
1.087827
1.674883
-4.004571
-2.285964
-.1565224

Unused commitments (Illiquid)
Credit lines (Illiquid)
All other off- balance sheet liabilities
Net credit derivatives (semi-liquid)
Net securities lent (semi-liquid)
Net participation acquired (Liquid)

1/2
1/2
1/2
0
0
–1/2

–1.674883
–4.004571

1.674883
4.004571

–1.674883

1.674883

Panel A: Asset-side weights
Cash

Trading Assets/
Available for sale
/ Held to maturity

Available for sale
Loans

Fixed Assets

Intangible Assets
Other Assets

0
1/2
1/2
1/2

Panel B: Liability-side weights
Fed funds repo
Deposits

Trading liabilities
Other borrowed money

Other Liabilities
Total Equity Capital
Panel C: Off balance sheet-side weights
Contingent Liabilities- illiquid guarantees

Semi-liquid guarantees
Liquid guarantees

Notes: 1. All securities regardless of maturity are taken as liquid assets under Berger-Bouwman index 2. Loans secured by real estate is a sum of residential
and commercial real estate loans 3. Unused commitments include revolving, open-end loans, unused credit card lines, to fund commercial real-estate
related loans, to provide liquidity to ABCP conduit structures, to provide liquidity to securitization structures, other unused commitments 4. Credit lines
include ﬁnancial standby letters of credit, performance standby letters of credit, commercial and similar letters of credit. 5. Haircut is the difference
between asset’s collateral value and its sale price. 6. Overnight index swaps (OIS) enable ﬁnancial institutions to exchange ﬁxed rate interest payments
for ﬂoating rate payments based on speciﬁed principal amount.

ture a maturity mismatch, i.e., how much cash the bank can raise
against its balance sheet to withstand the cash withdrawals in case
of a stress event in which all claimants seek to extract the maximum liquidity. Since our goal is to employ an index of liquidity
creation and not mismatch, we change the signs of the weights
accordingly. A description of the weights and construction of the
index is presented in Appendix B.

The estimation of Eq. (1) using this alternative measure of liquidity creation is presented in Table 7 for the three deﬁnitions of
the treatment variable. Overall, it shows consistent results, with a
signiﬁcantly higher liquidity creation among treated banks during
QE3.
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4.6. Other robustness checks

fects of asset purchase programs. In particular, evidence thus far
suggests that the type of assets purchased by central banks can affect the channels through which the policy impacts the real economy. Further research can exploit whether the heterogeneity of
asset types purchased through QE can explain, for example, the
weaker evidence of a bank lending channel in European countries
(Butt et al., 2014; Ryan and Whelan, 2019).

We perform a series of further robustness checks of our main
results. First, we introduce a new treatment variable based on the
mean values of MBS holdings to total assets. This dummy variable
takes the value of 1 if a bank is in the top 50% of the distribution of MBS-to-total assets in 2007Q4 and 0 if it lies in the bottom 50th percentile. Second, we conduct a sub-sample analysis by
dropping observations in the ﬁrst and third quarter in each year, in
which small BHCs that only ﬁle the FR Y-9SP do not report data.
The results are presented in Appendix C Fig. 11 and are qualitatively similar to the ones obtained in our main speciﬁcation. We
still ﬁnd a stronger support for a differential increase in liquidity
creation during QE3.
Next, in Appendix C Table 10, we consider alternative proxies for liquidity creation, namely the liquidity transformation gap
proposed by Deep and Schaefer (2004) and the cat nonfat measure in Berger and Bouwman (2009). First, we construct the measure of liquidity transformation in Deep and Schaefer (2004) as
the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets, normalized by total assets. A higher liquidity transformation gap occurs when banks are largely ﬁnanced by liquid deposits and hold
mostly illiquid loans. Results in Appendix Table 10 columns (1)-(6)
are largely consistent with the Berger and Bouwman (2009) and
Bai et al. (2018) measures of liquidity creation. Second, we construct the Berger and Bouwman (2009) cat-nonfat index (scaled
by total assets) that includes loans based on category (cat) and
excludes off-balance sheet items (nonfat). Fig. 9 shows that both
measures of liquidity creation follow similar trends at the aggregate level: there is a spike just prior to the start of the 2008 Global
ﬁnancial crisis, followed by a sharp decline at the start of the crisis and a gradual increase afterwards. The increase is more pronounced after 2012, which corresponds to the start of QE3, particularly for the cat fat measure, which is the main one employed
in our analysis. This suggests that the “liquidity destruction” that
took place after the global ﬁnancial crisis happened off-balance
sheet (through, for example, loan commitments). As such, the results pertaining to the cat nonfat measure of liquidity creation are
stronger across all rounds of QE, conﬁrming the importance of
looking at off-balance sheet activity that is captured in our main
speciﬁcation (see Appendix Table 10, columns (7)-(12)).

Appendix A. Variables employed: construction and
corresponding deﬁnition in the Fed database

Variable Name

Deﬁnition

Data Sources

Securities holdings

Held-to-maturity securities
FR-Y9C
(BHCK1754) + available-for-sale
securities (BHCK1773)
Treasury Securities
Trading Assets: Treasury Securities
FR-Y9C
(BHCK3531)
Bank Size
Log of total assets (BHCK2170)
FR-Y9C
Equity ratio
Total equity capital (BHCK3210)
FR-Y9C
divided by total assets (BHCK2170)
Deposits
Non-interest bearing deposits in
FR-Y9C
domestic oﬃces (BHDM6631) +
interest-bearing deposits in
domestic oﬃces (BHDM6636) +
non-interest bearing deposits in
foreign oﬃces (BHFN6631)
Reserves
Cash and balances due from
FR-Y9C
depository institutions: non
interest bearing balances and
currency
and coin (BHCK0081) + interest
bearing balances in U.S. oﬃces
(BHCK0395) + interest bearing
balances in foreign oﬃces, Edge
and Agreement subsidiaries, and
IBFs (BHCK0397)
Real estate lending
Loans secured by real estate
FR-Y9C
lending (BHCK1410) divided by
total assets (BHCK2170)
C&I lending
Commercial and industrial loans to
FR-Y9C
U.S. addressees (BHCK1763) +
commercial and industrial
loans to non-U.S. addressees
(BHCK1764) divided by total assets
(BHCK2170)
FR-Y9C
Total lending
Total loans (BHCK2122) divided by
total assets (BHCK2170)
Net Income
Net income (BHCK4340) divided by
FR-Y9C
total assets (BHCK2170)
Treasury Purchases
Amount of Treasury securities
New York Fed
purchased by the Federal Reserve
in a given quarter
MBS Purchases
Amount of MBS purchased by the
New York Fed
Federal Reserve in a given quarter
This table presents the data sources and the method of construction of the
variables used in our analysis.

5. Conclusions
We study the effects of large scale asset purchases on bank liquidity creation. While existing evidence shows how LSAPs can affect bank lending, our work takes a new approach by looking at
whether banks that beneﬁted more from the Fed’s three rounds of
QE have also contributed more to the creation of liquidity in the
economy.
We show that banks with a higher share of assets in mortgagebacked securities prior to the start of the program have increased
both real estate and commercial loans disproportionally more following the ﬁrst and third round of QE. However, not all types of
loans contribute the same to liquidity creation, which increases
more when banks give out more illiquid loans such as commercial lending. As such, we ﬁnd evidence that treated banks contributed more to liquidity creation only in the last round of QE,
which started in 2012, and when the Fed bought large amounts
of mortgage backed securities. This points to important asymmetric effects of this unconventional monetary policy across banks and
suggests that its impact on liquidity creation, one of the main functions of the banking sector, was not strong across the entire duration of the program.
In line with previous research, our results suggest that future
policy interventions should consider the potential asymmetric ef-

Appendix B. Liquidity Creation Measures
Table 8 presents the weights employed in the construction of
the Berger and Bouwman (2009) and Bai et al. (2018) (LMI) measures of liquidity creation. Both measures take into account the
components of on and off-balance sheet items including assets, liabilities, equity and off-balance sheet items such as loan commitments and derivatives. In Berger and Bouwman (2009), assets and
liabilities are classiﬁed as liquid, semi-liquid and illiquid. LMI assigns weights to the market liquidity of assets, which range from
0 (hard or time-consuming to sell, such as ﬁxed assets) to 1 (very
liquid items such as cash). These weights are multiplied by one
minus the repo haircut of the asset class (available from the authors). The calculation of asset side weights includes haircuts as it
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Table 9
The impact of QE on bank lending: additional controls.

QE1 × T reati
QE2 × T reati
QE3 × T reati
QE1 ×
QE2 ×
QE3 ×







Total Lending

Real Estate Loans

C&I Loans

(1)

(3)

(5)

0.039
(0.058)
0.079
(0.095)
0.412∗ ∗ ∗
(0.119)



MBS
Assets i



MBS
Assets i

14,611
0.733
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(4)

0.043∗ ∗
(0.019)
0.025∗ ∗
(0.011)
0.062∗ ∗ ∗
(0.020)

0.010
(0.008)
–0.001
(0.014)
0.062∗ ∗ ∗
(0.017)

MBS
Assets i

Observations
R-squared
Bank-level controls
QEτ × Controls
Year-quarter ﬁxed effects
Bank ﬁxed effects

(2)

29,172
0.771
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

0.154
(0.160)
0.197∗ ∗
(0.092)
0.382∗ ∗ ∗
(0.119)
14,565
0.466
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)

–0.038
(0.060)
0.029
(0.034)
0.091∗
(0.049)

29,125
0.566
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

–0.025
(0.331)
0.485∗ ∗
(0.206)
0.449
(0.295)
14,588
0.216
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,117
0.311
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(2) is log of Total lending, in Columns (3)-(4) is the log of
real estate loans and in Column (5)-(6) is the log of commercial and industrial loans. T reati is a
th
dummy that takes the value one for banks in the
 75 percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio,
MBS
is the ratio of MBS to Total assets in 2007Q4.
and zero for banks in the 25th percentile. Assets
i
Q Eτ ∈ [Q E1, Q E2, Q E3] are dummies for each QE wave. Bank-level controls include the log of total
assets, Tier 1 capital ratio, the net income to total assets and equity over assets. Constant terms included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ represent signiﬁcance at the
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.

measures how much cash can be borrowed against the asset. Then,
haircut adjusted weights are multiplied by each asset category. The
liability-side weights are assigned based on maturity. Each initial
weight for liabilities is multiplied by a liquidity premium (spread
between the overnight index swapped rate and Treasury bill rate).
Since LMI is an indicator that measures mismatch of liquidity between assets and liabilities, we revise its weights to convert it
into a liquidity creation measure by changing the sign to match
that of the Berger and Bouwman (2009) index (see Column 5
in Table 8).

Appendix C. Robustness tests

Fig. 11. Robustness test: alternative treatment deﬁnition and restricted sample
analysis. The ﬁgure shows coeﬃcient estimates of θˆ  in Eq. (1), where dependent
variable is liquidity creation to total assets. The ﬁrst three coeﬃcients are from a regression that uses an alternative treatment deﬁnition as a dummy equal 1 if banks
have an above the mean ratio of MBS to total assets in 2007Q4 and 0 below the
mean. The last three coeﬃcients are from a restricted sample analysis using only
data on banks that report in all periods. First estimation includes year-quarter ﬁxed
effects, while the second state-time.

Fig. 10. Robustness Table 5 using matching techniques. The ﬁgure shows coeﬃcient
estimates of θˆ  in Eq. (1) where the dependent variable is liquidity creation to total
assets. Data is weighted using propensity scores based on total assets.
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Table 10
Alternative measures of liquidity creation.
Liquidity Transformation Gap

QE1 × T reati
QE2 × T reati
QE3 × T reati
QE1 ×
QE2 ×
QE3 ×







(1)

(2)

–0.000
(0.004)
0.013∗ ∗
(0.006)
0.036∗ ∗ ∗
(0.009)

–0.006∗
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
0.029∗ ∗ ∗
(0.004)

MBS
Assets i

(3)

–0.005
(0.022)
0.075∗ ∗
(0.032)
0.198∗ ∗ ∗
(0.048)



MBS
Assets i



MBS
Assets i

cat non-fat to TA
(4)

T reatiD

QE3 × T reatiD
Observations
R-squared
Controls
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
Bank Fixed Effects
State-time Fixed Effects

14,620
0.310
Yes
Yes
Yes

Controls
Bank Fixed Effects
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects
State-time Fixed Effects

Yes
Yes
Yes

14,460
0.878
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(6)

(7)

(8)

0.010∗
(0.005)
0.029∗ ∗ ∗
(0.008)
0.057∗ ∗ ∗
(0.011)

0.001
(0.004)
0.015∗ ∗ ∗
(0.006)
0.046∗ ∗ ∗
(0.004)

–0.035∗ ∗
(0.014)
0.052∗ ∗
(0.020)
0.183∗ ∗ ∗
(0.014)

QE1 × T reatiD
QE2 ×

(5)

29,181
0.359
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,077
0.869
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

0.004
(0.007)
0.023∗ ∗
(0.011)
0.044∗ ∗ ∗
(0.014)

–0.003
(0.008)
0.017
(0.012)
0.034∗ ∗ ∗
(0.009)

5872
0.298
Yes
Yes
Yes

5488
0.903
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

14,620
0.142
Yes
Yes
Yes

14,460
0.865
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

(9)

(10)

0.051∗
(0.028)
0.149∗ ∗ ∗
(0.038)
0.314∗ ∗ ∗
(0.062)

-0.003
(0.017)
0.106∗ ∗ ∗
(0.024)
0.290∗ ∗ ∗
(0.017)

29,181
0.129
Yes
Yes
Yes

29,077
0.840
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

(11)

(12)

0.013
(0.009)
0.039∗ ∗ ∗
(0.013)
0.062∗ ∗ ∗
(0.018)

-0.004
(0.008)
0.024∗ ∗
(0.011)
0.046∗ ∗ ∗
(0.008)

5872
0.190
Yes
Yes
Yes

5488
0.898
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes

The dependent variable in Columns (1)-(6) is liquidity transformation gap in Deep and Schaefer (2004), Columns (7)-(12) ratio of Berger and Bouwman (2009) cat- nonfat
liquidity measure to total assets (TA). T reati is a dummy that takes the value one for banks in the 75th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the

MBS
25th percentile. T reatiD is a dummy that takes the value one for banks in the 90th percentile of the MBS-to-total assets ratio, and zero for banks in the bottom 10th . Assets
i
is the ratio of MBS-to-total assets in 2007Q4. QEτ is a dummy variable for each QE wave, where t= 1,2,3. Bank-level controls include: logarithm of total assets, Tier 1 capital
ratio, deposits to assets ratio, equity to assets ratio and return on assets. Constant term included but not reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ , ∗ ∗ , ∗ represent
signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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